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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: IS THE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY UNDER THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
BROADER IN SCOPE THAN IT IS
UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION?
City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995)
Joseph Beatty*
Respondent, Arlene Kurtz,' applied for a job with the City of North
Miami as a clerk-typist.2 During her interview for the position, she was
informed that a City regulation required all prospective City employees
to sign a sworn affidavit stating that they had not used any tobacco
products for a year or-more? Respondent disclosed to the interviewer
that she smoked and therefore could not truthfully sign the affidavit in
compliance with the regulation.4 The City then informed her that she
would not be considered for the job.5 Respondent filed suit,6 asking the
court to enjoin enforcement of the regulation and to declare that it
violated Respondent's right of privacy under the Florida Constitution.!
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City.' On

* Dedicated to William G. Clause.
1. City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 1995).
2. Id. at 1027.
3. Id. The regulation at issue was the City of North Miami's Regulation 1-46,
promulgated in March 1990. See Kurtz v. City of North Miami, 625 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1993). The regulation provides in pertinent part: "All applicants must be a nonuser [sic]
of tobacco or tobacco products for at least one year immediately preceding application, as
evidence [sic] by the sworn affidavit of the application [sic]." Answer Brief of Respondent at
4, Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1025 (No. 92-2038). The City adopted the regulation in an effort to
reduce costs and increase worker productivity. See id. at 1027. The regulation applied only to
job applicants and did not affect current City employees. See id.
4. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027. Kurtz had smoked for more than 30 years and alleged that
she had tried, but was unable to stop. Answer Brief of Respondent at 4, id. (No. 92-2038).
5. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
6. Id. Respondent sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Id.
7. Id. Respondent also claimed other constitutional violations. Answer Brief of
Respondent at 13, id. (No. 92-2038). Respondent sought no damages. Id. She did not seek a
court order directing the City to hire her for the clerk-typist job or directing the City to fairly
consider her for the job. Petitioner's Initial Brief at 3 n.2, id. (No. 92-2038).
8. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
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appeal, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed,9 and in a
separate order certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of
whether the City had violated Respondent's right of privacy under the
Florida Constitution.' When an individual seeks government employment, the court concluded, any expectation of privacy as to the
disclosure of whether the individual smokes is not reasonable." Thus,
the Florida Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and HELD, that
requiring job applicants to abstain from using tobacco for one year as
a prerequisite to government employment does not violate the
applicants' right of privacy under the Florida Constitution. 2
Before 1980, the privacy interests of Floridians were only protected
by the right of privacy under the Federal Constitution, which serves as
the minimum guarantee in all states. 3 In 1980, Florida expressly
guaranteed its citizens a right of privacy when article I, section 23, was
added to the Florida Constitution. 4 In FloridaBoard of Bar Examiners
Re: Applicant," the Florida Supreme Court began to define the scope

9. Kurtz, 625 So. 2d at 903.
10. See Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1026. The certified question was:
DOES ARTICLE I, SECTION 23 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
PROHIBIT A MUNICIPALITY FROM REQUIRING JOB APPLICANTS TO
REFRAIN FROM USING TOBACCO OR TOBACCO PRODUCTS FOR ONE
YEAR BEFORE APPLYING FOR, AND AS A CONDITION FOR BEING
CONSIDERED FOR EMPLOYMENT, EVEN WHERE THE USE OF TOBACCO
IS NOT RELATED TO JOB FUNCTION IN THE POSITION SOUGHT BY THE
APPLICANT?
Id. The Florida Supreme Court had jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida
Constitution. Id.
11. Id. at 1028. The court concluded "that individuals have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the disclosure of [whether one smokes) when applying for a government job and,
consequently, that Florida's right of privacy is not implicated under these unique circumstances."
Id.
12. Id. The case was remanded to the Third District Court of Appeal with directions to
affirm the trial court's decision. Id. at 1029.
13. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1.6, at 19 (5th ed. 1995).
14. Article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution provides: "Every natural person has
the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as
otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of
access to public records and meetings as provided by law." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. Article I,
section 23 was added to the Florida Constitution by general election on November 4, 1980. See
Jerry L. McDaniel, III, Comment, Constitutional Law: Florida's Privacy Protection for
Obscenity, 43 FLA. L. REV. 405, 409 (1991).
15. 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
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of this new right. 6 In Board Examiners, Applicant sought admission
to The Florida Bar. 7 However, because he refused to respond to a
question on The Florida Bar application that asked him to disclose any
and all regular treatment for mental illness, his application was
rejected.'8
Stating that Florida's right of privacy is not an absolute guarantee
against all intrusions by the state into an individual's private life, the
Florida Supreme Court reasoned that the scope of the new right was
within its discretion to define. 9 The Board Examiners court held that
Applicant's right of privacy was clearly implicated by the application
question.' The, court also concluded that the legitimate interest of the
state in regulating lawyers meets any standard of review and declined
to articulate a standard for future assertions of constitutional privacy
protection in Florida.2'
The standard of review applicable to Florida's right of privacy was
announced two years after Board Examiners in Winfield v. Division of
Pari-MutuelWagering.' In Winfield, the petitioners' bank records were
subpoenaed by Florida governmental agencies.' The petitioners asked
that the bank be enjoined from complying with the subpoenas and that
the subpoenas be declared an unconstitutional violation of petitioners'

16. See id.; McDaniel, supra note 14, at 409 n.38.
17. Board Examiners, 443 So. 2d at 72.
18. Id. at 72-73. Applicant refused to answer question 28(b) on the application on the
grounds that it violated his constitutional rights. The question asked:
Have you ever received REGULAR treatment for amnesia, or any form of insanity,
emotional disturbance, nervous or mental disorder?... If yes, please state the
names and addresses of the psychologists, psychiatrists, or other medical
practitioners who treated you. (Regular treatment shall mean consultation with any
such person more that two times within any 12 month period.)
Id. at 73. Applicant was notified by letter that the number of visits to a psychologist,
psychiatrist, or other medical practitioner was raised to four times in any 12-month period. Id.
at n.1. Applicant also modified a release form that was required by the Bar so that the release
was ineffective as to his medical records. Id. at 72.
19. Id. at 74; see McDaniel, supra note 14, at 409, 416.
20. BoardExaminers, 443 So. 2d at 74. However, the court concluded that the state had
a compelling interest in the selection of only those who are fit for the practice of law. Id. at 75.
It held that this intrusion was, therefore, constitutional. Id. at 74.
21. Id.
22. 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
23. Id. at 546. These agencies were the Department of Business Regulation and the
Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering. Id.
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right of privacy.24 Describing the right of privacy as a fundamental
right, the Florida Supreme Court announced a two-part test.
Under the Winfield test, the threshold inquiry is whether the
individual asserting the right has an expectation of privacy as to the
alleged intrusion into the individual's private life.26 Only if the court
finds that such an expectation exists, will the court then apply the
compelling state interest standard.27 In Winfield, the court recognized
an expectation of privacy in an individual's bank records.28
The Winfield court announced that the explicit right of privacy in the
Florida Constitution29 is broader than the correlative implied right"° in
the Federal Constitution." The federal right of privacy is implicated
only when the individual's expectation of privacy is legitimate and the
intrusion is unreasonable.32 Under the Florida Constitution, the Winfield
court explained, the expectation of privacy analysis is subjective.3" This
analysis depends upon the expectation of the specific individual
asserting the right and not the expectation of a reasonable person.'
In Winfield, however, the court did not make clear in its analysis
whether it actually applied a subjective standard. The court, referring in
general terms to the expectation of "an individual," appeared to apply

24. Id. The petitioners alleged not only that the subpoenas violated their privacy rights,
but that any conversion of their bank records into public records subsequent to the bank's
compliance with the subpoena also was unconstitutional. Id.
25. Id. at 547.
26. Id.
27. Id. The compelling state interest standard requires that the state prove it has a
compelling interest at stake and that it chose the least intrusive means to serve that interest. Id.
28. Id. at 548. However, as in Board Examiners, although the right of privacy was
implicated, the intrusion met the compelling state interest standard and was therefore upheld. Id.
29. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
30. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (observing that the right of privacy has
been implied under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal
Constitution and "in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights").
3 1. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548.
32. See Veronia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391 (1995). In Vernonia, the
United States Supreme Court stated that the federal right of privacy "does not protect all
subjective expectations of privacy." Id. The Court then discussed "the 'reasonableness' inquiry"
as to the intrusion. Id. at 2392-93; see also Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 153 (Fla. 1989)
(Ehrlich, C.J., concurring) (comparing "the federal standard of 'reasonable expectation of
privacy,' which protects an individual's expectation of privacy only when society recognizes that
it is reasonable to do so" with the subjective standard in Florida).
33. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548. The court looked at the legislative history behind article
I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, noting that "[tihe drafters of the amendment rejected
the use of the words 'unreasonable' or 'unwarranted' before the phrase 'governmental intrusion'
in order to make the privacy right as strong as possible." Id.
34. Id.
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an objective standard.35 No reference was made to evidence of the
petitioners' subjective expectations of privacy as to their bank records.
The Florida Supreme Court more emphatically endorsed a subjective
standard for the expectation inquiry in Shaktnan v. State." Shaktman
involved the question of whether a law enforcement agency violated an
individual's right of privacy when it installed a device to capture the
telephone numbers dialed by the individual in his home." The surveillance device was installed after the petitioner," a probationer from a
prior bookmaking conviction, was overheard by the police discussing an
illegal gambling operation.39
The court determined that an individual's privacy rights were
implicated when the government collects information on the numbers
dialed by that individual.' The court recognized that the numbers
individuals dial will become known to the telephone company."
However, the court concluded that this "disclosure" was only incidental
to the indiyiduals' use of the telephone company's services and had no
effect on their expectation of privacy from the government.42
The Shaktman court announced that the right of privacy protects the
inviolable power of individuals to make independent choices, for their
35. Id.
36. 553 So. 2d 148, 150-51 (Fla. 1989). The Florida Supreme Court stated: " 'A
fundamental aspect of personhood's integrity is the power to control what we shall reveal about
our intimate selves, to whom, and for what purpose.' " Id. at 150-51 (quoting Bryon, Harless,
Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d 83, 92 (1st DCA 1978),
quashed and remanded on other grounds, 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980)). Expanding on this
statement, the court added, "[b]ecause this power is exercised in varying degrees by differing
individuals, the parameters of an individual's privacy can be dictated only by that individual."
Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 149.
38. Shaktman was not the only petitioner. Shaktman was joined in the gambling operation
at issue by Mart, a known bookmaker, and Norman Rothman, a known felon. Id. at 150.
39. Id. at 149-50. The police received a tip from an unidentified informant that Shaktman
was engaging in illegal activities. Id. After observing him conversing with Mart, a known
gambler and bookmaker, the police extended surveillance to Mart. Id. at 150. The circuit court
approved the State's motion for permission to intercept outgoing phone numbers through the use
of a pen register operation on the telephones in Mart's Miami Beach apartment. See id.
40. Id. at 151.
41. Id.
42. Id. The court reasoned that " '[t]he concomitant disclosure to the telephone company,
for internal business purposes, of the numbers dialed by the telephone subscriber does not alter
the caller's expectation of privacy and transpose it into an assumed risk of disclosure to the
government.... [It is somewhat idle to speak of assuming risks in a context [sic] where, as
a practical matter, the telephone subscriber has no reasonable alternative.' "Id. (quoting People
v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 141 (Colo. 1983)). However, as in Board Examiners and Winfield,
the court found that the intrusion was constitutional because it satisfied the compelling state
interest standard. Id. at 151-52.
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own reasons and purposes, about whether to disclose personal information and to whom. 43 As in Winfield, although the court articulated a
subjective standard for the individual's expectation, the court did not
appear to actually apply a subjective standard." The court failed to
consider any evidence of the independent and personal expectations of
the petitioner. 4' Referring to "the individual" or "the telephone subscriber," the determination was couched in the language of an objective
standard.'4 Chief Justice Ehrlich's concurring opinion in Shaktman
emphasized47 that the expectation of privacy inquiry in Florida is a
determination of the subjective expectation of the specific individual
asserting the right. 48 Although there is a requirement that the
individual's expectation not be falsely or spuriously asserted, Chief
Justice Ehrlich's concurrence explained there is no requirement that the
expectation be reasonable.49
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court quoted a phrase from
this discussion in the concurring opinion." Although the phrase refers

43. Id. at 150. The court stated that "[tihis right [of privacy] ensures that individuals are
able 'to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others.' " Id. (quoting A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967)). The
court further explained that "[t]he central concern is the inviolability of one's own thought,
person, and personal action. The inviolability of that right assures its preeminence over
'majoritarian sentiment' and thus cannot be universally defined by consensus." Id. at 151
(footnote omitted).
44. See id. at 151-52.
45. See id. at 151.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 152-53 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Ehrlich explained that he wrote
his concurring opinion "only to emphasize the method by which we determine the applicability
of article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution." Id.
48. Id. at 153 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring).
49. Id. (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring).
50. See City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995). The discussion
in Shaktman's concurring opinion surrounding the language quoted by the Kurtz court included
the following observations:
The words "unreasonable" or "unwarranted" harken back to the federal standard
of "reasonable expectation of privacy," which protects an individual's expectation
of privacy only when society recognizes that it is reasonable to do so. The
deliberate omission of such words from article I, section 23, makes it clear that the
Florida right of privacy was intended to protect an individual's expectation of
privacy regardless of whether society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.... [T]he zone of privacy covered by article I, section 23, can be determined
only by reference to the expectations of each individual....
Shakiman, 553 So. 2d at 153 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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293

to "objective manifestations""1 as a way to ascertain the specific
individual's subjective expectation of privacy', the Kurtz court did not
rely upon any evidence of Respondent's own personal expectation in
reaching its decision. 2 Instead, the Kurtz court considered evidence of
common experience, 3 speaking only generally of "smokers" and
"individuals."' The phrase "in today's society" was used twice in the
only paragraph that discussed evidence of an expectation of privacy.5
No phrase comparable to "in Respondent's life" appeared anywhere in
that paragraph. 6
In reaching its holding in Kurtz, the Florida Supreme Court
concluded that Respondent's expectation of privacy as to whether or not
she smoked was not reasonable." Therefore, the court held her right of
privacy was not implicated. By its own express terms, this holding
suggests that in practice the Florida Supreme Court will not protect an
expectation of privacy unless it considers it to be reasonable. After
Kurtz, the court's announcements of a subjective standard for the
individual's expectation of privacy in Winfield and Shaktman must be
viewed, as a practical matter, with extreme caution.
In Shaktman, the court noted that an individual may disclose
information to a commercial entity incidental to a service the entity
provides to the individual. The court held that this fact did not defeat
the individual's expectation of privacy as to the disclosure of the same
information to the government.' The Shaktman evidence consisted of
an individual's "disclosure" to the telephone company of the telephone

51. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1028.
52. See i4. At least some evidence of the specific subjective expectation of Ms. Kurtz
appears to have been available for the court's consideration. See Petitioner's Initial Brief at 15,
id. (No. 92-2038).
53. See id. at 1028.
54. Id.; see infra note 57.
55. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1028; see infra note 57.
56. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1028.
57. Id. The court stated:
[G]iven that individuals must reveal whether they smoke in almost every aspect of
life in today's society, we conclude that individuals have no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the disclosure of that information when applying for a government
job and, consequently, that Florida's right of privacy is not implicated under these

unique circumstances.
Id.
58. Id.
59. Shaktman, 553 So. 2d at 151; see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
60. Shaktman, 553 So. 2d at 151; see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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numbers the individual dialed from his home.6 This disclosure was
only incidental to the individual's use of the telephone company's
services.'
Similarly, the instant court relied upon evidence of individuals'
disclosures to commercial entities in determining whether the City
regulation violated Respondent's right of privacy.63 These disclosures
were incidental to securing services from those entities.' Specifically,
the disclosures consisted of expressions of a preference for special
accommodations set aside for either "smokers" or "non-smokers,"
chiefly by restaurants, hotels, and car rental agencies." Yet, contrary
to its own finding in Shaktman, the court in Kurtz found that this type
of evidence does defeat the individual's expectation of privacy.'
The key to the Kurtz decision may be found in a single phrase,
limiting the holding to those situations "when [individuals are] applying
for a government job."'6 7 The reason for this limitation is not discussed

61. Shaktman, 553 So. 2d at 151; see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
62. Shakiman, 553 So. 2d at 151; see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
63. See Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1028.
64. Id.
65. Id. The court also listed an example related to employment: "[E]mployers generally
provide smoke-free areas for non-smokers, and employees are often prohibited from smoking
in certain areas." Id. It is problematic, however, to infer that, by their conduct with reference
to a smoke-free area in the work place, employees necessarily disclose their private smoking
conduct outside the work place and outside work hours.
66. See id. In fact, the Kurtz evidence is far less probative of the private conduct it was
offered to prove than is the Shaktman evidence as to the private conduct it was offered to prove.
The Shaktman evidence consisted of disclosures to the telephone company of the numbers that
an individual dialed on a telephone at home. Shaktman, 553 So. 2d at 149 n.3, 150. These
disclosures were offered as evidence of private telephone use. Such disclosures are unavoidably
incidental to the individual's use of telephone company services. They are, therefore, highly
probative evidence of private telephone use. The Kurtz evidence, on the other hand, consisted
of presumed disclosures of the individual's preference for special smoking accommodations in
restaurants, hotels, and car rental agencies. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1028. The court presumed that
these disclosures occurred based on the court's observation that smokers are "constantly required
to reveal" their private smoking conduct as an incident to the use of these services. Id. However,
unlike the Shaktman disclosures, these disclosures are not, in fact, unavoidably incidental to the
individual's use of these services. The existence of "first available" and "no preference" options
demonstrates that such disclosures are only optionally incidental to the use of these services.
Therefore, the Kurtz disclosures were presumed to have occurred based on a requirement that
does not, in fact, exist. Even when the individual chooses to express a preference as to a
smoking accommodation, such an expression is highly ambiguous as evidence of private
smoking conduct. The expressed preference may be based on attributes of the accommodation
unrelated to the individual's smoking conduct, such as availability or location, or it may be
based on a desire to accommodate the preference of a companion.
67. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1028. The Florida Supreme Court concluded "that individuals
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the disclosure of that information when applying
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in the decision. The court, other than in this limitation of its holding,
does not suggest the fact that Respondent sought employment with the
government made any difference to its analysis. Yet, this fact may
explain why the same type of evidence that left the expectation of
privacy unaltered in Shaktman defeated the expectation of privacy in
Kurtz. In Shaktman, the state68came to the individual, while in Kurtz, the
individual came to the state.
In both Kurtz and Board Examiners, an individual voluntarily came
69
to the state to avail himself of a government privilege or opportunity
to which the individual had no constitutional right. 0 Despite their
similarities, the court reached opposite conclusions on the expectation
of privacy issue.7 Applicant in Board Examiners put his own fitness
at issue by coming to the state for a license to practice law.72 Respondent in Kurtz also put her fitness at issue by coming to the state for a
job. 3 Yet in Board Examiners, the court held that the individual's
privacy interests were implicated74 while in Kurtz, the court held that
they were not." The critical difference between the two cases is that
Board Examiners was decided before the Winfield test was formulated
while Kurtz was decided afterward.76 For the Board Examiners court,
there was no explicit threshold test for determining an individual's
expectation of privacy.

for a government job and, consequently, that Florida's right of privacy is not implicated under
these unique circumstances." Id.
68. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
69. See Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027; Board Examiners, 443 So. 2d at 72.
70. See Kurtz, 625 So. 2d at 902 (holding that "[a]n applicant does not have a
constitutional right to government employment"); see also Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale,
427 So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. 1983) (stating that "an individual does not have a constitutional right
to be hired by the government"); Headley v. Baron, 228 So. 2d 281, 284 (Fla. 1969) (stating that
"an individual has no constitutional right to be hired by the government"); Jones v. Board of
Control, 131 So. 2d 713, 717 (Fla. 1961) (holding that a police officer has no constitutional right
to be a police officer).
71. See Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1028; BoardExaminers, 443 So. 2d at 74.
72. Board Examiners, 443 So. 2d at 74, 77. The court explained that "[bly making
application to the Bar, [the applicant] has assumed the burden of demonstrating his fitness for
admii-sion into the Bar." Id. at 74. Furthermore, the court explained, "it is applicant himself who
placed his mental and emotional fitness as well as his moral and educational fitness in issue."
Id. at 77.
73. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
74. Board Examiners, 443 So. 2d at 74.
75. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1028.
76. Board Examiners was decided in 1983, Winfield was decided in 1985, and Kurtz was
decided in 1995. See Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1025; Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 544; Board Examiners,
443 So. 2d at 71.
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Just two months after Kurtz, the United States Supreme Court, in
Vernonia School District v. Acton," also suggested that the expectation
of privacy may be reduced when the individual voluntarily comes to the
state.78 The Vernonia Court held that suspicionless drug testing of
student athletes did not violate their right of privacy under the Federal
Constitution. 9 Student athletes, the Court concluded, have a reduced
expectation of privacy once they "go out for the team."8 " Analogously,
an individual who applies for a government job naturally expects greater
governmental intrusion into his life than does the individual who stays
at home or seeks only private employment.
The federal right of privacy requires that the individual's expectation
of privacy must be legitimate and that the intrusion must be reasonable.8 ' The Florida Supreme Court has pronounced that Florida's right
of privacy offers broader protection than the federal right because it has
no reasonableness requirement as to the governmental intrusion. 2
However, the fact that the implicit rationale in Kurtz is analogous to the
explicit rationale in Vernonia suggests that the Florida Supreme Court
has, in practice, contracted Florida's expectation of privacy threshold
down to the minimum limit as defined by the federal standard.
In Kurtz, the court found the Florida right of privacy to be more
expansive than it actually is by characterizing the federal right as more
constricted than it actually is. The court cited Carey v. Population
83 for the proposition that federal privacy protecServices International
tion extends only to interests related to marriage, procreation, and
children. 4 The Carey Court, however, expressly cautioned against the

77. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
78. Id. at 2393. The court stated:
[S]chool athletes have a reduced expectation of privacy. By choosing to "go out
for the team," they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even
higher than that imposed on students generally .... Somewhat like adults who
choose to participate in a "closely regulated industry," students who voluntarily
participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights
and privileges, including privacy.
Id.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 2397.
Id. at 2393.
Id. at 2391-92.
Winfleld, 477 So. 2d at 548; see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027-28.
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use of these limited interests to mark the "outer limits" of the federal
right of privacy."
The Kurtz court also offered as dispositive on the issue of federal
privacy protection that a "right to smoke" is not recognized by the
federal courts. 6 In Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 7 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that there is no per se constitutional right
to smoke.88 However, the Grusendorf court emphatically rejected the
notion that the holding was dispositive as to the implication of privacy
interests when a non-smoking regulation restricts private conduct.8 9 In
fact, the court reasoned that "[i]t can hardly be disputed" that a
regulation that restricts smoking outside the work place and beyond paid
work hours implicates an employee's right of privacy.'
When the Kurtz court used Carey and Grusendorfto characterize the
federal right as extending less protection than it actually does, it
simultaneously characterized the Florida right of privacy as extending
more protection than the Florida right actually does. After Kurtz,
however, it is apparent that the state constitutional right of privacy in
Florida extends protection no greater in scope than the minimum federal
guarantee. Even if the Florida Constitution had contained no express
right of privacy, the Florida Supreme Court could not have narrowed
any further the scope of the privacy protection extended to Floridians.

85. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85. The Court cautioned that "the outer limits of this aspect

of privacy have not been marked by the Court." Id. at 684.
86. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1028 (citing Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539

(10th Cir. 1987)).
87. 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987).
88. Id. at 541.
89. Id. at 542. The court refused "to accept the defendants' contention that, since cigarette

smoking has not been recognized as a fundamental right, no balancing test nor rationale of any
kind whatsoever is needed to justify the restriction." Id.
90. Id. at 541. The court stated:
It can hardly be disputed that the Oklahoma City Fire Department's non-smoking
regulation infringes upon the liberty and privacy of the firefighter trainees. The
regulation reaches well beyond the work place and well beyond the hours for
which they receive pay. It burdens them after their shift has ended, restricts them
on weekends and vacations, in their automobiles and backyards and even, with the
doors closed and the shades drawn, in the private sanctuary of their own homes.
Id. Nonetheless, the court upheld the non-smoking regulation because the state has a heightened
interest in the regulation of firefighters, and the regulation was rationally connected to this

interest. Id. at 543.
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